[ForemanRules]

The US Versus the Peace Process

Let us turn to the second question raised at the outset, and examine whether it is indeed correct to stress the continuity of US goals and policies.

For many years, the US has stood virtually alone in opposition to international efforts to initiate a "peace process" on the Middle East. The UN record brings out the issues with considerable clarity. The Security Council was eliminated as a forum years ago, thanks to the US veto. At its annual winter meetings, the General Assembly regularly passes resolutions calling for a conference on the Arab-Israel crisis, most recently, in December 1990 (144-2, US and Israel in opposition). In December 1989, the vote was 151-3, Dominica joining the two rejectionist states; a year earlier, 138-2; and so on. US international isolation dates to February 1971 -- coincidentally, the very month when George Bush achieved national prominence as UN Ambassador. The US has also barred other initiatives. Given US power, its opposition amounts to a veto. Accordingly, there has been no international effort to deal with the conflict. The peace process has been effectively deterred.

Again, the matter is described differently within the ideological system; in this case, just about universally, including scholarship. We read constantly that the Middle East is "littered with American peace plans" (editorial, Boston Globe),7 and that US efforts have continually run aground because of the fanaticism and irrationality of Middle East extremists. Such descriptions are accurate, if we bear in mind the literary conventions: the term "peace process" is restricted to US government initiatives, including moves to bar attempts to achieve peace. It then follows as a matter of logic that the US is always advancing the peace process, and if internationally isolated, as in this case, it is alone in this endeavor. Efforts that the uninstructed might misconstrue as "the peace process" are really attempts to obstruct peace, that is, to interfere with US plans. It is really quite simple, once the norms of political correctness are understood.

Departing from these norms, one should have no difficulty in understanding the traditional US opposition to the peace process. The UN resolutions call for an international conference, and the US brooks no interference in what President Eisenhower described as the most "strategically important area in the world," with its enormous energy reserves. This is US turf: no independent force is allowed, foreign or indigenous. As Henry Kissinger explained in a private communication, one of his major policy goals was "to ensure that the Europeans and Japanese did not get involved in the diplomacy" concerning the Middle East, a goal achieved at Camp David in 1978, and again in the current diplomacy -- that is, in the two cases that qualify as steps in the "peace process" in US rhetoric. Furthermore, UN and other initiatives endorse a Palestinian right of self-determination, which would entail Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. While there has been an elite policy split over the matter, the prevailing judgment for the past 20 years has been that enhancement of Israeli power contributes to US domination of the region. For these reasons, the US has always blocked attempts at diplomatic resolution, apart from its own rejectionist initiatives.

It should be noted that the US opposition to diplomacy is not unusual. Southeast Asian and Central American conflicts provide examples familiar to those who have escaped the doctrinal system. The same has been true, quite often, of disarmament and many other issues, and US isolation at the UN extends far beyond the Middle East. These are natural concomitants of the role of global enforcer, committed to policies with little appeal to targeted populations but with ample force at the ready.

The basic terms of the international consensus on the Arab-Israel conflict were expressed in a resolution brought to the Security Council in January 1976, calling for a settlement on the pre-June 1967 borders (the Green Line) with "appropriate arrangements...to guarantee...the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries," including Israel and a new Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The resolution was backed by Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the PLO -- in fact "prepared" by the PLO according to Israel's UN Ambassador Haim Herzog, now President. It was strenuously opposed by Israel and vetoed by the United States, once again in 1980.

These events are -- automatically -- out of history, along with other facts unacceptable to US power, including repeated PLO initiatives through the 1980s calling for negotiations with Israel leading to mutual recognition. The facts have been distorted beyond recognition, often barred outright, particularly by the New York Times. Its Pulitzer prize-winning correspondent Thomas Friedman has shown particular dedication to the task, an achievement appreciated by the journal, which promoted him to chief diplomatic correspondent in recognition of his accomplishments. It is an interesting case, because he knows enough to understand exactly what he is doing. This stellar performance permits Friedman to spin wondrous tales about "the birth of a new pragmatism among the Palestinians" from the late 1980s, now raised "another important notch" through *****'s benign influence at Madrid. Until Madrid, Friedman continues, "both sides have hidden behind [the] argument...that there is no one on the other side with whom to negotiate" -- Timesspeak for the fact that the PLO has for years been calling on Israel to negotiate, but the US and Israel refuse, claiming there is no one with whom to negotiate, while Friedman loyally reports as truths the US-Israel propaganda which he knows perfectly well to be pure fabrication. The Palestinians admitted by the US to the Madrid conference called "explicitly for a two-state solution," Friedman writes admiringly -- so different from the despised PLO, which supported (or perhaps "prepared") the UN resolution calling for a two-state solution 15 years ago.8

The meaning of these shenanigans -- one of the more impressive achievements of modern propaganda -- is that the State Department and its spokesman believe that US-Israeli violence may at last have succeeded in bringing the Palestinians to heel. In the preferred rhetoric, the great achievement of Madrid was "the Palestinian self-adjustment to the real world," Palestinian acceptance of "a period of autonomy under continued Israeli domination," during which Israel can build the facts of its permanent domination with US aid. This willingness to follow US orders -- the real world -- has "tossed the negative stereotypes out the window," Times journalist Clyde Haberman observes approvingly. The "autonomy" offered at Madrid had been described two weeks earlier in Ha'aretz by Danny Rubinstein, one of the most acute observers of the occupied territories for many years: it is "autonomy as in a prisoner-of-war camp, where the prisoners autonomous' to cook their meals without interference and to organize cultural events."9

The most outspoken critic of US Middle East policy, Anthony Lewis, offered a new proof of the brilliance of Bush-***** diplomacy. Their "singular achievement" at Madrid "was quickly measured" by an election in Gaza in which moderates won a resounding victory over the fundamentalist extremists, sending "the message that Palestinians are ready to negotiate." This message is "of profound significance to Israelis," Lewis continues, telling the many doubters "that there are reasonable Palestinians, people ready to make peace, people not so different from themselves." In the past, "the ordinary Palestinians, with familiar aspirations for a decent life and a national identity, were drowned out by Palestinian terrorists," and "the Palestinian political leadership" was "reluctant to say plainly that it was ready to live in peace alongside of Israel." But now the dread PLO is no longer feared and the moderates can raise their heads, as shown by the Gaza elections in which the PLO won 13 of 16 seats contested.10

The internal contradiction is easily resolved. We need only recall the real world, in which the PLO had been calling for negotiations and a peaceful settlement with Israel for many years, while the US and Israel never countered with any "reasonable people ready to make peace," just as they do not today, and Israel supported the fundamentalist extremists in its efforts to fend off the PLO moderation that it has always feared. But that solution is unacceptable. In a well-run ideological system, internal contradiction is far preferable to politically incorrect reality.

Over the years, the US has continued to implement its rejectionist program without interference from meddling outsiders. The current circumstances afford an opportunity to carry the process further, with a diplomatic process run solely by the United States in accord with the principle that "What we say goes." Gorbachev's presence at Madrid was intended to provide a thin disguise for unilateral US control; in reality, he is acceptable as the powerless leader of a country that scarcely exists. The "peace process" is structured in accordance with US intentions. Palestinians are not permitted to select their own representatives, and those who pass US-Israel inspection are part of a Jordanian delegation. The US alone dictates the terms. I will turn to details and background directly, but the basic facts are surely clear enough.

The standard picture is, again, rather different. Few have been so critical of US Middle East policy as New York Times correspondent Anthony Lewis, who lauds the President for having had "the vision and the courage to commit himself to this conference," in which "Israel will meet face-to-face with each of its Arab neighbors -- and with representative Palestinians" -- namely, those acceptable to the US and Israel, whatever Palestinians might prefer. Diplomatic correspondent R. W. Apple expands in a typical paean to our leader's "vision of the future" as he made use of "the historic window of opportunity." He identifies two factors that have made it possible for Bush "to dream such great dreams" about Israel-Arab peace: First, there is now no fear that "regional tensions" might lead to superpower confrontation; Second, "no longer must the United States contend with countries whose cantankerousness was reinforced by Moscow's interest in continuing unrest."11

Both of Apple's points are correct, though translation is again required. The truth that lies behind his first point is that the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the world scene has made it easier for the US to resort to force to gain its ends, a fact that has led to fear and desperation among the traditional victims throughout the Third World. One reason why the US insisted on war in the Gulf, deflecting the danger of a peaceful diplomatic settlement, was to demonstrate that it is now able to use extremes of violence against defenseless enemies without concern over the Soviet deterrent. As noted, the familiar lessons are again being taught in the postwar period.

To interpret Apple's second point, we must recall that the "cantankerous" agents of Soviet disruption include the US European allies, the major Arab states, the nonaligned countries, in fact, essentially the world, apart from Israel. Apple's formulation reflects the standard doctrinal assumption that the US position on any issue is necessarily RIGHT, as a matter of logic, so those who stand in our way are "cantankerous," probably Comsymps to boot.

There is an intriguing sidelight to the US-Israeli insistence that the political representatives of the Palestinians be excluded from negotiations. The official reason is that the PLO is a terrorist organization. Under Israeli law, anyone who has any dealings with it is subject to criminal penalties under the Law for the Prevention of Terror. The prime targets are Palestinians, but the law has also been used to punish Jews for contacts with the PLO, most recently, the courageous Abie Nathan, jailed once again.12 The background for the law was reviewed by one of Israel's leading legal commentators, Moshe Negbi, discussing a recent academic study of Lehi (the "Stern gang"), published on its 50th anniversary. Negbi's article is entitled "The Law to Prevent Meetings with the Head of State." As he explains, the Law for the Prevention of Terror was instituted on the initiative of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion six days after the assassination of UN Ambassador Folke Bernadotte. Ben-Gurion's goal was to break up Lehi, known at once to be responsible for the assassination. One of the three commanders of Lehi was Yitzhak Shamir. The law not only barred any contact with Shamir, but was also applied against Menahem Begin's terrorist Irgun Zvai Leumi (Etsel), impelling Begin to dismantle his Jerusalem organization. It was also used to jail religious extremists, including Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, currently chief Rabbi. It was bitterly denounced as a "Nazi law, dictatorial, immoral" and hence illegal, by Menahem Begin and other civil libertarians. Despite efforts to have it modified under Labor governments, it remained in force, formally directed against Shamir and his Lehi associates, until 1977, when Begin was elected Prime Minister. Today the "Nazi law" still remains in force, but only to bar contacts with the PLO and to justify the US-Israeli refusal to permit Palestinians to select their own representatives for negotiations.13

Those who think that Shamir might have renounced his past enthusiasm for terrorism -- which reached quite interesting levels -- might usefully turn to his comments on the occasion of the anniversary of Lehi on September 4, 1991: "We believed in what we said, discussed and wrote," he said: "Therefore, it was correct." "From the moral point of view, there is no difference between personal terror and collective terror. Here and there blood is spilled, here and there people are killed. One must look and judge it from the point of view of the utility of that means, the use of personal terror, in leading to the goal."14